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Abstract: Answering to the questions posed by students, I clarify my position on four main
topics: (i) the pragmatic maxim; (ii) the relation between my conception of truth on one
hand, and epistemic conceptions of truth and the idea of the convergence of our cognitive
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1. Answer to question 71
This question – addressed both to me and Professor Westphal – concerns
the difference that the pragmatic maxim makes to philosophy.
The pragmatic maxim came into being in answer to the question of
how it is possible to make our ideas clear; it differs from other answers to
that question because it invites us to look at the practical-applicative
components of our intellectual constructs. It was formulated by Charles
Sanders Peirce and adopted and defended in different ways by William
James and John Dewey. A vast literature has been published on the topic
of both an interpretative and generally theoretical kind, regarding its cor-
rect formulation, the way of intending it, its area of application and its
justification.
On the general level I have nothing to add to the answer that Profes-
sor Westphal (2015b: §5) gave to this very same question. I would only
like to underline the great importance of the distinction he made between
neo-pragmatists such as Quine and more authentic and ‹substantial› prag-
matists who, like Wilfrid Sellars, moved along the lines of the ‹fathers›
1 I present my answers in order facilitating unified treatment. References cited in these
Replies are listed in the bibliography to my main contribution.
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of the pragmatist movement. Such a distinction is important not only
from the perspective of historical reconstruction but also from the theo-
retical point of view, because authentic pragmatists had the merit of
bringing to the fore the necessity of making reference to the pragma and
the externalism this involves in reaching clarification of philosophical
questions. This holds true, in particular, for two aspects of the pragmatic
maxim I would like to briefly consider now: its critical value and its use-
fulness in light of an explicative reconstruction of our concepts.
Concerning the first aspect, the pragmatic maxim reinforces the dis-
trust of metaphysical and ontological speculations developed on a mark-
edly aprioristic basis, neglecting the dimension of experience and cogni-
tive practices. In this sense it proved to be a useful critical tool in the
hands of philosophies of an empiricist, positivist and scientific inspira-
tion, finding convergence with Kantian criticism of traditional metaphys-
ical systems. In this regard I would like to pay homage to the philosophi-
cal tradition of my country by reminding the readers that the pragmatic
maxim was adopted and analyzed by two Italian pragmatists, Giovanni
Vailati and Mario Calderoni. These philosophers (both, unfortunately,
prematurely deceased) had the merit of seeing and discussing – well
ahead of Quine – the relationship between the conception of meaning
based on the pragmatist criterion and Pierre Duhem’s criticism of the
possibility of crucial experiments (either verifying or falsifying), criti-
cism that led to the development of the holistic conception of experimen-
tal control (see Vailati 1905/1972: 220–222; Calderoni 1924: 260ff.).
Calderoni also realised how the defense and the use of the pragmatic
maxim in an anti-metaphysical function could draw some advantages
from the attention to the so-called procedural aspects of philosophical
discussion. From this perspective such a maxim
says only that the onus of proving that a certain assertion has some
meaning or how it acquires one befalls to the person enunciating it and
not to the person who hears it being enunciated. This, which may seem of
little importance, has instead a great importance, similar to the impor-
tance of some  procedural  rules that may appear to  be only a negligible
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pedantry, but are the ones without which the possibility of knowing and
punishing a crime would vanish. (Calderoni 1924: 263–264)
This attention to the procedures – Calderoni continues – is particularly
relevant in the case of philosophy:
as we can say that the refusal to declare the sense of the sentences used
under the pretense that it is evident and intuitive is the constitutive, con-
stant methodical device of a good half of past and present philosophical
schools. (Calderoni 1924: 264f.)
As far as the second aspect is concerned, the pragmatic maxim has the
merit of leading to the emergence of the importance of pragma in order
to reach an explicative reconstruction of notions that play a crucial role
in science and philosophy. For example, it is a wide-spread conviction
that Einstein’s adoption of an attitude very similar to the one expressed
by the pragmatist criterion allowed him to sharpen the operational-
verificational analysis of simultaneity, and so to formulate the special
theory of relativity with the consequent setting aside the notions of abso-
lute time and space. What is less known is the deep influence that Vailati
and Calderoni’s ideas exercised on the Italian mathematician Bruno de
Finetti in elaborating his subjectivistic conception of probability (see
Parrini, 2011a).
Coming, finally, to my philosophical position, it also rests, among
other elements, on the conviction that, after the numerous objections ad-
dressed to the neo-positivist verification principle, a critical attitude to-
wards metaphysics can be taken up only moving along the track marked
by Kant, in other words taking as a starting point a general theory of
knowledge. I think, though, that also to justify a general theory of knowl-
edge it is fundamental to see how effectively we operate when we are
engaged in the cognitive activity in any field of human knowledge, from
the scientific to the historical and the legal one. In order to understand
what knowledge is, we need to draw not only upon the analysis of the
main epistemological concepts considered in abstract, but also upon the
analysis of what we really do when we try to know something. On this
point I found my position near not only to one famous Einstein statement
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about physics and the physicists (1936), but also to Professor Westphal’s
position. In fact, Professor Westphal interprets and revalues the essential
aspects of original pragmatism, placing at the center of attention the di-
mension of «what we do, how we do it, and what we do it with; in short:
our practices and procedures» (see Westphal 2015e: §3.3). I also believe
that a theory of knowledge so devised can welcome Kant and Hegel’s
cognitive semantics, rightly rehabilitated by Professor Westphal. This
reinforces my critical attitude toward metaphysics and today’s possible
worlds semantics, regarding which I fully share what Professor Westphal
says at the end of § 2.2 of his answer to my paper (Westphal 2015b).
2. Answer to question 4
I am asked to specify the relationship between my positive philosophy
and Peirce’s characterization of truth in terms of the indefinitely long run
convergence of the scientific community’s opinion towards a dynamic
(evolutionary) reality that constrains inquiry.
In § 5.4 of Answer to Question 7 Professor Westphal (2015b) rightly
observes that Peirce’s statement should not be intended as a «definition
of truth», but as «an idealization of what may ultimately be found to be
true». With this premise, I would like to specify that the central impor-
tance I ascribe to pragma is one of the main reasons for my strong dis-
trust not only of Kant’s notion of transcendental, intended in the strong
and genuine sense in which it is defined in the Critique of Pure Reason
(see Parrini 2015a: n. 1), but also of the use of the notion of convergence
to characterize the aim and development of cognitive activity, especially
as realized in scientific research.
Differently from what some have suggested, my conception of truth is
not to be understood as an epistemic conception of truth. For example,
we must not compare it, let alone confuse it, with the doctrine of truth as
«an idealization of rational acceptability» theorized by Hilary Putnam in
a particular phase of his thought (Putnam 1981: 55). For me truth is …
truth, and has all that strength familiar also (and I would add especially)
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to those who try to manipulate it. What do I mean by this? I mean that for
my notion of truth, what Kant said about the notion of Wirklichkeit holds
true (17811–17872/1985: 113–115, A79–83, B105–109, 239, A218=
B265f.), in other words: reality is a category and therefore a primitive
indefinable concept.
Obviously considering reality a primitive indefinable concept is not
tantamount to denying that this concept has a content of its own that dis-
tinguishes it from other primitive concepts such as that of ‹possibility› or
of ‹substance›; it only means that the concept of reality, on a par with the
other primitive concepts, cannot be characterized on the basis of the
complex of criteria that usually guide us in its application, in other
words: it is empty ‹criterially› (see Parrini 2015a: n. 10). In fact for Kant
the postulates of empirical thought in general are not definitions of the
modal notions of reality, possibility and necessity, but principles that
license, govern and limit their use within the boundaries of experience.
In the case of the category of reality, this means that in Kant’s concep-
tion the application of such a concept is constrained by the constitutive
components of phenomenal objects, in other words by the formal and the
material components of our knowledge. These two kinds of components,
and not reality, are the constraints on inquiry. What we consider real is
the result of the interaction between them. Similarly, for my conception
(admittedly inspired by Kant’s), the epistemic criteria that usually guide
the use of the notion of truth (for example, the reference to the data of
experience, recourse to presuppositions of a theoretical nature, and meth-
odological rules such as those of simplicity, elegance, compactness, and
so forth) must not be considered as defining marks of such a notion, but
as a plastic and historically variable set of values and epistemic princi-
ples that discipline its use in an orienting and fallible way, conditioning
our always revisable attributions of truth. For me reason and rationality
have an open texture; and we must recognize the same open texture to the
set of our guiding criteria of truth (see Parrini 1995/1998: VII/2; see also
Parrini 2015a: n. 10).
That is why saying, as I do, that truth is only and simply truth entails
that it cannot be dealt with epistemically, not even according to modali-
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ties that allow (at least in the intentions of proponents) to maintain the
distinction between ‹deeming true› and ‹being true›. For me truth pos-
sesses the same strength that it possesses for the metaphysical realist,
although it does not indicate, as holds for classic metaphysical realism,
some kind of ‹mysterious› form of correspondence between our cognitive
claims and reality in itself. Similarly to goodness and beauty, truth is a
value, a regulative ideal that sustains and inspires the synthesis of today
and future experiences via concepts, theories and methodological rules
submitted to a continual process of adjusting and improvement. In fact,
our usual and intersubjectively testable applications of this category
seem to be destined to always remain tentative, revisable, and irremedia-
bly closed within the circle (linguistically, theoretically, and metho-
dologically structured) of some experiences ‹motivating› other experi-
ences, without ever being able to attain a reality considered in itself.
In my conception of truth there is no place for the idea of a conver-
gence (more or less gradual) of past, present, and future cognitive syn-
thesis. In fact I not only reject the forms of metaphysical realism grouped
under the name of ‹convergent realism› and the forms of absolute ideal-
ism similar to Hegel’s, but also the forms of logical-formal idealism in
line with Cassirer’s conception of a progressive convergence of the cog-
nitive process towards the individuation of the «ultimate logical invari-
ants» of experience (Cassirer 1910/1953: 269; emphasis in the German
edition: 357). I do not even favor Peirce’s characterization of truth in
terms of the indefinitely long run convergence of the scientific commu-
nity’s opinion towards a dynamic reality that constraints inquiry. What I
deem real (in an empirical sense) is, as I was saying, the fruit of a synthe-
sis of the material and formal components of knowledge, where to such a
distinction between formal and material we need to ascribe not an abso-
lute value, but a purely relative value as dependent on the structure of the
context of epistemic justification within which we move (as happens in
the case of the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions).
Therefore what we consider as real, in the sense of empirically real, is
not a constraint of inquiry; the (empirically) real is something constituted
and the constraints of research are instead the formal and material
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components, especially the component we commonly call experience, in
other words that complex of empirical data that in the various contexts of
inquiry, until one has proof to the contrary, one tends to consider unpro-
blematic.
I would like to add that since 1976, when in Linguaggio e teoria. Due
saggi di analisi filosofica I proposed the idea of a contextualised or
relativized a priori – insisting already then on the necessity of a ‹double›
relativized a priori: the analytic-linguistic one and the genuinely constitu-
tive one of a synthetic-theoretical nature (see Parrini 2015a: n. 1) – I was
very careful not to advance any pretense to thus resolve the problems of
incommensurability raised by Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend.
Differently from Michael Friedman – who many years later also advo-
cated the idea of a relativized a priori (though without distinguishing
between those two kinds of a priori and recognizing the necessity of
both) – I do not think that saving the rationality of science requires
adapting Peirce’s idea and considering «our present scientific community
… as an approximation to a final, ideal community of inquiry … that has
achieved a universal, trans-historical communicative rationality on the
basis of the fully general and adequate constitutive principles reached in
the ideal limit of scientific progress» (Friedman 2001: 73).
Positions such as Friedman’s (just quoted) remain entrapped in a con-
ception (the so-called conception of a ‹unique grand narrative›) that ne-
glects some valid acquisitions made by postmodernist experience. More-
over, such a conception is not easily put into practice, in view of the con-
siderable problems met by the notions of continuity, convergence, and
also (quoting the expression used by young Reichenbach) of stetige
Erweiterung2 when trying to apply them to the historical transformations
of knowledge. I think it is possible to defend the rationality of our cogni-
tive efforts (in particular, and mainly, those that find their accomplish-
ment in scientific achievements) without relying upon the undoubtedly
‹heavy› idea of an intellectual process that proceeds de claritate in
claritatem and neglects the actual, torturous development of knowledge.
2 See the German edition of Reichenbach (1920/1965: 77).
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To preserve the value of rationality for our claims of truth, or of approxi-
mations to truth, it is enough to individuate and maintain the purely
value-laden and regulative dimension of the idea of truth as a tension
towards the highest form of systematization and conceptual articulation
of experience – without hiding from ourselves the possibility that, in
some cases, also our best efforts towards comprehensive cognitive syn-
thesis must stop at levels of integration that are not altogether satisfying
(see Parrini 1995/1998: 143–159).
3. Answer to question 6
The question posed by Nicola Freschi asks me to specify the relationship
between my positive philosophy and skepticism.
First of all I wish to say that also regarding the problem of skepticism
my conception tried to avoid any compromise with the idea of the con-
vergence of our cognitive efforts.
A particularly strong version of the skeptical objection, very close to
the one found in this question, has been highlighted with particular clar-
ity by Professor Westphal in a passage of his book on Hegel’s epistem-
ological realism where he specifies that
Sextus has fingered a real difficulty for any theory undertaking the estab-
lishment of the resemblance or representational reliability of the senses,
namely, proving that sensory states are reliable when there can be no in-
dependent access to the relation between those states and their putative
objects. (1989: 13)
In order to deal with skepticism with adequate accuracy, I would need to
revise the full complex of arguments and logical-conceptual analyses I
developed in Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy
(1995/1998) and later in the works connected to this book which pro-
vided the material for two other books: Sapere e interpretare. Per una
filosofia e un’oggettività senza fondamenti (Parrini 2002) and Il valore
della verità (Parrini 2011). This is evidently impossible. I can indicate,
though, two key aspects of my ‹positive philosophy› that are linked with
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the theme of skepticism. It seems to me that they can draw strength from
some ideas that Professor Westphal had the merit of re-proposing, mak-
ing relevant and re-developing.
The first such aspect is this. I am convinced that if we place ourselves
in the absolutistic point of view typical of metaphysical realism, it is im-
possible to overcome the skeptical objection, including global perceptual
skepticism. If we take as our starting point the idea that philosophy has to
explain how it is possible for knowing subjects endowed with our percep-
tive and intellectual skills to attain a knowledge capable of giving us (al-
beit in hypothetical and conjectural terms) a representation of reality in
itself (Kant’s Ding an sich), then skepticism is inevitable and I do not
think that there are arguments (including transcendental arguments) capa-
ble of facing and neutralizing it. Like my Professor Giulio Preti, I believe
that metaphysical realism and skepticism are two faces of the same coin;
actually, skepticism should be considered as a kind of immanent or inner
criticism of absolutism – but this for me is not to be considered as a
proof of its logical inconsistency; see Parrini (2004, esp.: 189–199).
If instead we take as our starting point the idea that knowledge is a
fact and not a problem, in other words, that in spite of the skeptic’s ef-
forts, he fails to convince us that knowing is impossible because this
clashes with our experience of being able to develop an activity of a cog-
nitive kind, then the problem we face is one of elaborating a concept or
conception of knowledge that can justify, or give account of, our convic-
tion. To achieve such an aim it is not enough to take into consideration
what emerges from analyses of the notion of knowledge considered in
abstracto, such as those resting on truth considered as adaequatio
intellectus et rei (the putting into practice of which is precluded by skep-
ticism) or those based on characterizing knowledge as true justified be-
lief (a characterization questioned by Gettier’s well known paradox). It is
necessary to integrate the analysis of the abstract concept of knowledge
with the analysis of our actual cognitive practices.
The difficulty that emerges at this point is that the results of the anal-
ysis of the abstract concepts and the results of the analysis of our cogni-
89
Esercizi Filosofici 10, 2015
tive pragma are not completely congruous with each other3. So, if we
want to reach a philosophically coherent notion of knowledge as respon-
sive as possible to both our abstract concepts and to our effective prac-
tices, we must move along the line of what Herbart called ‹reworking of
concepts› (Bearbeitung der Begriffen), and Carnap called ‹explication›
of concepts. Only in this way can we reach some epistemological notions
of knowledge, truth, and reality that are both self-reflexively coherent
and capable of avoiding skepticism. Hence my proposal to intend knowl-
edge as an integrational activity or a rational synthesis of the empirical
material, a proposal which finds its accomplishment in a conception of
truth as regulative ideal and in a (correlated) conception of reality as em-
pirical reality4.
Coming to the second aspect, already in Knowledge and Reality
(1995/1998) I tried to show that my perspective – which aims at keeping
away from the metaphysical traits still present in Kant and in Hegel and
is rightly called ‹positive› for this reason – allows us to make use of
some arguments that hit both skepticism and that Cartesian approach crit-
icized by Professor Westphal too. Modern science in fact does not try to
overcome skeptical doubts of a global nature (for example, global per-
ceptual skepticism or hyperbolic Cartesian doubts) and to certify its own
legitimacy by searching for indubitable certainties such as those Des-
cartes sought. Modern science overcomes global skepticism by setting it
aside and implicitly showing its irrelevance by adequately delimiting the
range of its own statements. The generalized skeptical stance depends
upon the generic possibility of making mistakes or of being deceived,
which can be invoked in any circumstance. This possibility «relies on a
general, always-available doubt, independent of any specific mode of
instantiation or mechanism of operation» (Fine & Forbes 1986: 238).
The scientific method instead (in some respects a refining of procedures
3 In this connection it would be opportune to quote and look in depth into what I called
‹Duhem’s Pascalian dilemma›: «We have an impotence to prove, which cannot be conquered
by any dogmatism; we have an idea of truth which cannot be conquered by any Pyrrhonian
skepticism» (quoted from Duhem 1904–061–19142/1962: 27).
4 See my answer to Question 4 and Parrini (2015a: n. 10).
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we normally use in everyday life) consists in: (a) admitting the possibil-
ity of global skeptical doubts; (b) seeing whether in the different contexts
«it can be articulated (i.e., made specific, concrete, and testable)» (ibid.);
(c) if that is not possible, it is legitimate to bracket it off «as a mere pos-
sibility and proceed» with our work, «returning periodically» to (b)
(ibid.). Conforming itself to such a method, my positive philosophy
states that «the possibility of doubt arising is not itself a reason to doubt
of any particular proposition; more exactly, it is not a reason to abstain
from using the best beliefs we have – those which have been found to be
successful and free from specific doubt – to build on» (Shapere 1984:
xxvi; see Parrini 1995/ 1998: 194f.).
Nevertheless, the possibility of using successfully the above specified
method depends upon having provisionally accepted a rational proposal
of explicative reconstruction – rational in the sense that it is based on
analyses of concepts and discursive arguments – characterized by these
two qualifications: (1) from the substantive point of view it requires us to
qualify the reality which is the object of our cognitive claims as empiri-
cal reality (and not as metaphysical reality); (2) from the methodological
point of view it requires evaluation for its global merits, in other words
as an attempt to give an account of the complex of our beliefs, convic-
tions, and experiences in a way we deem optimal with respect to other
equally global conceptions (for example, the realism based on the best
explanation or Bas van Fraassen’ constructive empiricism) – without de-
nying, of course, that this evaluation too cannot rely on demonstratively
conclusive arguments and is therefore bound to remain, like the rest of
our knowledge, hypothetical, conjectural, and revisable in the light of
new possible data.
As I said in my Comment, «Empirical Realism without Transcenden-
tal Idealism» (Parrini 2015a), both these points (1) and (2) (empirical
realism and misgivings about the possibility of coercive arguments of a
transcendental kind) mark the difference between Professor Westphal’s
position and my own. In spite of this, I share the conclusion of the argu-
ments he developed in his important work on Kant (the existence «of mo-
lar objects and events in space and time» [2004: 3]) and I drew from his
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perceptive treatment precious elements to better define my own concep-
tion.
Two points in Professor Westphal’s analysis I found particularly en-
lightening and congenial to me:
(W1) The high value he sets on Kant’s epistemic-transcendental reflec-
tion, a reflection that I prefer to call epistemic-presuppositional
due to my misgivings about the transcendental. This is the specific
area of philosophical research and epistemological elaboration
and for me it distinguishes itself from both the formal domains of
logic and mathematics and those of empirical sciences.
(W2) His rich articulation of the fact that at the very level of epistemic
reflection we must confront skepticism in general and global per-
ceptual skepticism in particular. Professor Westphal, on the basis
of his deep and innovative reading of Kant and Hegel, brought to
light how we can neutralise global perceptual skepticism (and with
it the Cartesian epistemological approach) by showing that it is
linked to an idea of absolutely founded or justified knowledge that
has a sense for the formal dominions of logics and mathematics,
but is in principle inappropriate to the non-formal domains of em-
pirical knowledge, and therefore for factual knowledge both scien-
tific and commonsense. In other words: skepticism needs to be
refuted not so much showing logically its falsity or contradictory
nature, but sideling it by showing that the standards of knowledge
on the basis of which it pretends to judge the validity of our
empirical-factual cognitive claims are in principle inappropriate.
I think, though, that epistemic reflection is neither a formal domain such
as those of logic and mathematics, nor a factual dominion such as those
of the empirical sciences and commonsense. So, whereas I agree with
Professor Westphal that it is out of place to invoke global perceptual
skepticism to shed doubts on our empirical forms of knowledge, I do not
see as illicit or inappropriate recurring to its mere logical possibility to
show: (i) the cognitive impracticability of the notion of reality in itself or
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metaphysical reality, and (ii) the advantages of a notion of empirical re-
ality that conforms to an idea of knowledge as synthesis, or unification,
of the sensible manifold and to an idea of truth as regulative ideal. In
Kantian terms I would say that at the level of epistemic reflection we
have to deal with both the components regarding the logical possibility of
concepts (in our case, the concepts of reality and truth) and the compo-
nents regarding their real possibility. Therefore epistemic reflection can
move – and actually must move – on both these fronts. In the case of the
notion of reality it seems to me that its metaphysical connotations clash
directly with the Kantian words I quoted in my paper (2015a: § 2) on
what is «to us» an object of knowledge if we do not want such an object
to reduce to a mere «nothing» (Kant 17811–17872/1985: 134f., A104f.).
Hence the necessity of a conceptual reworking that leads us to intend re-
ality as empirical reality, the only one we humans can attain knowledge
of and with respect to which both the skeptical doubts of a global nature
and the foundational requests of a Cartesian kind sound inappropriate.
4. Answer to question 5
I have been asked to clarify my opinion on the relationship between phi-
losophy and science.
I think that what I said in the preceding answers has already shown
the great importance that I attribute to this topic. It is a recurrent theme
of my philosophical reflection, to which I also dedicated some specific
works (see, for example, Parrini 2012b).
History itself shows that the development of scientific thought and the
development of philosophical thought strongly influenced each other.
Science in its historical course both influenced and modified some clas-
sic themes of philosophical research (for example, the problem of a pri-
ori knowledge) to the point that sometimes it appropriated to itself topics
previously considered as exclusively pertaining to philosophy (for exam-
ple, the nature of space and time, or the relations between body and
mind); on the other side, the developments of philosophy sometimes
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deeply influenced the birth of highly innovative scientific theories, if not
‹revolutionary› (think of the influence of Herbart’s ideas on Riemann and
the formation of non-Euclidean geometries, or the weight of Hume’s
analysis of causality on Einstein in conceiving of the Special Theory of
Relativity). Also today many topics are dealt with by an intense and fruit-
ful interchange between philosophy and science (for example, the body/-
mind question, the relation between scientific theories, the problem of
reductionism and others). Therefore I still ascribe a general validity to
what Einstein once said regarding a particular branch of philosophy,
epistemology:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of a notewor-
thy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without
contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without episte-
mology is – insofar as it is thinkable at all – primitive and muddled.
(Einstein 19491/19512: 683f.)
Nevertheless, when we rightly recognize the existence of structural con-
nections between sciences and philosophical researches, we can also un-
derstand the rise of even harsh tensions between them. These tensions are
felt with particular intensity in a country like Italy that, starting from the
effects of the ‹Galileo case›, has not yet developed a strong and wide-
spread epistemological culture (think, for example, of the contrast be-
tween the mathematician Federigo Enriques on the one side and the phi-
losophers Croce and Gentile on the other, which ended, unfortunately,
with Enriques’s defeat [see Parrini 2004]). Looking especially at the Ital-
ian case and simplifying a little, I think that one of the main reasons of
‹misunderstanding› between the followers of the two disciplines derives
from the fact that many scientists judge philosophy without knowing it
enough, and, on the other hand many philosophers love pronouncing on a
science (mainly perceived as an enemy) of which they possess often a
generic image not to say imprecise and sometimes even pathetic.
Moreover, we are not always fully aware that scientists and philoso-
phers, although they can have something or a lot in common, always pro-
ceed with their own methodologies and interests which differ greatly. For
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a philosopher, what matters the most is the analysis of concepts and the
search for ‹globally comprehensive› perspectives. On the other hand, for
a scientist what matters the most is the ‹growth› of his discipline. So a
mathematician has at heart, first and foremost, the development of math-
ematics, independently of any potential ontological commitment to ab-
stract entities or, perhaps, logical contradictions that may derive from
excessive Platonism (at least to the extent that such contradictions do not
hinder his work in the field). If we then take a follower of this or that em-
pirical science, what matters most for him are the experiential data, logi-
cally and mathematically founded proofs, and the careful screening of
circumscribed, or circumscribable, conjectures.
Also on this point Einstein’s words are extremely enlightening. Al-
though underlining the importance of epistemology for science and of
science for epistemology, he has also observed that
no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought
his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the
thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject what-
ever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to
carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts
gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external con-
ditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit
him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his con-
ceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He there-
fore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupu-
lous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a
world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he
looks upon the concepts and theories as the free inventions of the human
spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positiv-
ist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the
extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among
sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean
insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indis-
pensable and effective tool of his research. (Einstein 19491/19512: 684)
I see a good deal of truth in these few sentences that in some ways antici-
pate Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism. For this very reason when
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we venture into problematic areas of interest to both science and philoso-
phy, we should be very careful not to set off on the wrong foot. For a
start, philosophers should beware not to give evaluations of scientific
work on the basis of their needs for an exhaustive system. Expressing
evaluations of this kind means doing a bad turn to both disciplines. Phi-
losophy, in fact, will constantly be put at risk of resounding scientific
refutations; science will find itself judged on the basis of normative re-
quirements that – if taken seriously – cannot but lead to absurd limita-
tions to the directions that science can follow. On the other hand, it is
equally important that scientists do not recognize as legitimate only those
reflections in epistemology and in philosophy of science that deal with
specific problems and can contribute to their scientific solution. Scien-
tists, in other words, should be able to accept the fact that philosophy
aims at clarification and reconstruction that are its own purposes. Just
think of the problems connected to skeptical instances that, as we saw,
are one of the main reasons of being for the philosophy of knowledge,
but are certainly of no primary interest for the development of particular
sciences.
I would like to add something on the theme of scientific specialism
and nowadays also of philosophical specialism. This, though, would
make this answer far too lengthy. Therefore I prefer simply to refer the
audience to the essay of mine mentioned at the beginning of this answer.
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